Rebalancing and the Chinese VAT: Some Numerical Simulation Results by Chunding Li & John Whalley
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
REBALANCING AND THE CHINESE VAT:









We are grateful to the Ontario Research Fund for financial support and to Chunbing Xing, Xiliang
Zhao, Hejing Chen, Jing Wang, Yan Dong and Risheng Mao for discussions. The views expressed
herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Chunding Li and John Whalley. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Rebalancing and the Chinese VAT: Some Numerical Simulation Results
Chunding Li and John Whalley




This paper presents numerical simulation results that suggest that China can both reduce its trade imbalance
and receive welfare benefits by switching the value added tax (VAT) regime from the current destination
principle to an origin principle. With the tax on exports exceeding that no longer collected on imports,
revenues rise and exports fall. VAT regime switching is thus a possibility for China to receive a double
benefit, rebalancing trade with a welfare gain. This has implications for present G20 discussions on
finding ways to adjust global trade imbalances. Under a destination principle, imports are taxed but
input taxes are rebated on exports (as currently). Under an origin basis imports are not taxed, but no
export rebates are given. Previous VAT literature stresses the neutrality of tax basis switches, which
simply reflect moving between consumption and production taxes, but neutrality only holds when
trade is balanced. In the unbalanced trade case for countries with a trade surplus, such as China, an
origin basis offers a lower tax rate on an equal yield basis and reduced exports. We use a two country
endogenous trade imbalance general equilibrium global trade model with endogenous factor supply,
a fixed exchange rate and a non-accommodative monetary policy structure which supports the Chinese
trade imbalance. We calibrate model parameters to 2008 data and simulate counterfactual equilibria
for VAT tax basis switches in which the trade imbalance changes. Our results suggest that given China’s
trade surplus VAT regime switching to an origin can decrease China’s trade surplus by over 50%,
and additionally increase Chinese and world welfare. The rest of the world’s production and welfare
improves simultaneously.
Chunding Li
Institute of World Economics and Politics








University of Western Ontario




Rebalancing and the Chinese VAT: Some Numerical Simulation 
Results 
 
Abstract: This paper presents numerical simulation results that suggest that China can 
both reduce its trade imbalance and receive welfare benefits by switching the value added 
tax (VAT) regime from the current destination principle to an origin principle. With the tax 
on exports exceeding that no longer collected on imports, revenues rise and exports fall. 
VAT regime switching is thus a possibility for China to receive a double benefit, rebalancing 
trade with a welfare gain. This has implications for present G20 discussions on finding ways 
to adjust global trade imbalances. Under a destination principle, imports are taxed but 
input taxes are rebated on exports (as currently). Under an origin basis imports are not 
taxed, but no export rebates are given. Previous VAT literature stresses the neutrality of 
tax basis switches, which simply reflect moving between consumption and production taxes, 
but neutrality only holds when trade is balanced. In the unbalanced trade case for countries 
with a trade surplus, such as China, an origin basis offers a lower tax rate on an equal yield 
basis and reduced exports. We use a two country endogenous trade imbalance general 
equilibrium global trade model with endogenous factor supply, a fixed exchange rate and a 
non-accommodative monetary policy structure which supports the Chinese trade imbalance. 
We calibrate model parameters to 2008 data and simulate counterfactual equilibria for VAT 
tax basis switches in which the trade imbalance changes. Our results suggest that given 
China’s trade surplus VAT regime switching to an origin can decrease China’s trade surplus 
by over 50%, and additionally increase Chinese and world welfare. The rest of the world’s 
production and welfare improves simultaneously.  
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1. Introduction 
The Chinese trade imbalance has been extensively discussed globally in 
recent years, and has been a major topic of discussion at G20 summits under the 
heading of rebalancing as agreed by the G20 in Pittsburgh in September 2009 in 
their Framework for Strong Sustainable and Balanced Growth (FSSBG). 
Despite this, concrete proposals for policy changes to address rebalancing are 
few. Here we report numerical simulation results which suggest that if China 
were to switch its value added tax (VAT) regime from the current destination 
basis (DB) to an origin basis (OB), the effect would be both reduce to 
significantly reduce China’s trade imbalance by over 50% and also increase 
China’s and world welfare. Other instruments than simply exchange rate 
realignments can thus contribute to rebalancing.  
This effect occurs because of China’s unbalanced trade and reflects the 
feature that under a destination basis, imports are taxed while input taxes are 
rebated (as currently), while under an origin basis, imports enter tax free but 
exports receive no tax rebate. Existing public finance literature stresses the 
neutrality for movements between these two bases, but for this to occur trade 
must be balanced. In the presence of a significant Chinese trade surplus, an 
equal yield origin basis tax lowers the tax rate, generates efficiency gains, and 
can also reduce the surplus.  
The analytical novelty in the paper is to work with a multi good trade 
model with an endogenous rather than an exogenous trade imbalance, as such  3
models are little used in the literature. Our 3 commodity 2 country 2 factor 
numerical general equilibrium trade model for China with an endogenous trade 
imbalance reflects China’s basket fixed exchange rate regime and non 
accommodative monetary policy. We present a monetized extension to a 
conventional trade model which builds on Whalley and Wang (2010) and in 
which the reminbi is inconvertible while at the fixed exchange rate (given 
monetary policy) the central bank accumulates reserves. We calibrate the model 
to 2008 data before performing basis switching counterfactual analyses. Data 
from the Chinese State Administration of Taxation show the VAT to be the 
largest revenue source for the national government in China, accounting for 
nearly 47% of Chinese total tax revenue in 2008 (CSY, 2009). Because of the size 
of the Chinese trade surplus, if the Chinese VAT regime were changed from a 
destination basis to an origin basis, the price of Chinese produced goods abroad 
would increase and that of foreign produced goods in China would decrease, and 
the trade surplus will fall. Under an equal yield tax change a consumer surplus 
gain would accompany the change due to a lower tax rate. 
Earlier literature discussion of VAT basis switches emphasizes that a switch 
from a destination based commodity tax to an origin based production tax has 
no real effects under conditions of trade balance and price flexibility (Whalley, 
1979; Grossman, 1980; Berglas, 1981; Lockwood et al, 1994); but is not neutral 
if a trade imbalance exists (Lockwood et al, 1994; Genser, 1998). The VAT is 
usually thought of as a consumption tax, based on the added value at each stage  4
of a products manufacturing or distribution. Credits apply to taxes paid by 
purchasers, and so it is ultimately passed on to the consumer who is ineligible for 
tax credits.  
Other related literature argues for the superiority of origin based taxes and 
these arguments are also relevant to the Chinese case. Berglas (1981), for 
instance, compares three different taxation bases, destination, origin and 
restricted origin. His results suggest that the origin basis is the superior one. He 
argues that the origin basis is as efficient as the other two; but the origin basis 
has lower administrative costs and it can be applied in different countries at a 
different rate which provides freedom for countries within the union wanting to 
pursue independent fiscal policies requiring a different fraction of the GDP as 
tax revenue. Georgakopoulos and Hitiris (1992) argue that in a second-best 
world, the restricted origin basis can be superior to the destination basis and 
differs from the analysis in Dosser (1967), Shibata (1967) and Shoup (1969), 
Lockwood et al (1995). The origin basis can also eliminate problems associated 
with the potential for cross-border shopping. Lastly, Keen and Lahiri (1998) 
compare destination and origin bases under conditions of imperfect competition, 
and find that in this case the origin basis gives exchange efficiency relative to the 
destination basis.  
Our numerical simulation results suggest that it could be advantageous for 
China to switch the VAT from a destination to an origin basis. China can not 
only reduce its trade surplus, but also either collect more tax revenue or on an  5
equal yield basis lower tax rates and improve welfare. The general equilibrium 
model we use employs a structure with a labor-leisure choice to provide 
endogeneity of factor supply, a fixed exchange rate and an endogenously 
determined trade surplus.  
The paper is organized as follows. Part 2 briefly discusses the Chinese VAT 
and discusses the potential impacts of basis switches for rebalancing. Part 3 
presents the model and outlines its calibration. Part 4 presents simulation and 
sensitivity analysis results. The last part presents conclusions.   6
2. The Chinese VAT Regime, Rebalancing, and Destination and 
Origin Bases 
China is unique in having two separate components of their VAT; one 
applying to domestic transactions (or domestic VAT) and one applying to 
international trade transactions (import VAT and export refunds). VAT, 
introduced in 1994, is one of the most Chinese important taxes in revenue terms. 
VAT revenues increased very quickly after its 1994 introduction, and VAT has 
been the largest tax revenue source in China in recent years. According to data 
from the State Administration of Taxation, Chinese domestic VAT revenues 
increased from 233.86 billion RMB in 1994 to 1799.69 billion RMB in 2008, 
increasing on average by 47.83% annually. Import VAT revenues increased from 
32.28 billion RMB in 1994 to 739.11 billion RMB in 2008, an on average increase 
of 156.4% (Figure 1). In 2008, Chinese domestic VAT and import VAT shares of 
total tax revenue were respectively 33.19% and 13.63%. These two parts of the 














Fig. 1 Chinese Total Tax and VAT Income (Unit: 100 Million RMB) 
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Fig. 2 Main Categories of Tax Revenues in China (Unit: %)  
Data Source: Statistics of State Administration of Taxation  
 
China’s VAT is administered by the State Administration of Taxation (the 
import VAT is collected by customs on its behalf), and the revenues are shared 
between the central government (75%) and local governments (25%). According 
to the Provisional Regulation of P.R.C on VAT, value-added tax, as in other 
countries, is to be paid by enterprises or individuals who sell merchandise, 
provide processing, repair, or assembling services, or import goods into the 
People's Republic of China. It is based on the added value derived from 
production, selling of merchandise, and providing industrial repairing or 
assembling service. For different taxable goods and services, different tax rates 
(including zero rates) apply, as listed in Table 1. VAT is the major source of 
revenue for all government levels in China, and particularly the central 
government. 
China’s VAT began on an experimented basis in the 1980s in selected 
provinces, when China began to implement VAT on 24 specified taxable items. 
In 1994, with the goal of building up the socialist market economy and following  8
guidelines of “unification of taxation management, equity of tax burden, 
simplification of tax system, personalization of revenue distribution relations 
and guarantee of the financial revenue”, the taxation system was changed. A 
State Council decree enacting a broader VAT on “The Provisional Regulation of 
the People’s Republic of China on Value Added Tax” then went into effect on 
January 1, 1994.  
 
Table 1 Chinese VAT Taxable Items and Rates 
Coverage of Collection  Rates  
Export of goods (except otherwise stipulated)  0%  
1. Agriculture, forestry, products of animal husbandry, aquatic products; 
2. Edible vegetable oil and food grains duplicates; 
3. Tap water, heating, cooling, hot air supplying, hot water, coal gas, liquefied petroleum 
gas, natural gas, methane gas, coal/charcoal products for household use; 
4.Books, newspapers, magazines (excluding the newspapers and magazines distributed by 
the post department);  
5. Feeds, chemical fertilizers, agricultural chemicals, Agricultural machinery and plastic 
covering film for farming; 
6. Dressing metal mineral products, dressing non-metal mineral products, coal. 
13%  
Crude oil, mine salt and goods other than those listed above, and services of processing, 
repairs and replacement. 
17%  
Source: Ministry of Finance, PRC, “Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Value-added Tax”. 
 
In 2004, China made further changes to the VAT in Heilongjiang, Jilin and 
Liaoning with the aim of revitalizing the industrial base of Northeastern China. 
A scheme of “increment deduction”, which shifts the previous production VAT 
regime to a consumer VAT system allowing enterprises to deduct the full amount 
of the input tax, was introduced for eight industries: equipment manufacturing, 
petrochemical, metallurgy, automobile, shipbuilding, new-and high-tech 
industries, and agricultural products processing. It was then extended to 26 
industrial cities in the Central Chinese provinces in 2007 in Henan, Hunan,  9
Hubei, Shanxi, Anhui and Jiangxi. In the second half of 2008, five areas of 
eastern Inner Mongolia and the earthquake devastated region of Wenchuan in 
Sichuan Province were added. 
China implemented further VAT changes nationwide in 2009, as a national 
move from a production-based VAT to one which is consumption-based. With 
the exception of a few specific industries, all industries in China are now able to 
offset the full amount of input VAT paid on newly purchased machinery and 
equipment against VAT collected when they sell their products.  
China’s VAT is effectively operated on a destination basis, so China 
imposes not only tariffs but also import-related VAT on goods imported as part 
of general trade
1. An import-related consumption tax is also levied on certain 
goods. For exports, China applies a zero VAT rate with the exception of certain 
restricted or prohibited goods and technologies. Effectively, there is no VAT on 
exports, and VAT already paid is refunded as an export tax rebate.  
The Chinese government began to implement export tax rebates in April 
1985, and a “full refund” principle was established in 1988. After tax reform in 
1994, the new VAT was introduced and export goods were to receive a full 
export rebate reflecting the tax paid on inputs. To implement the initial export 
tax rebates, the central government earmarked a certain amount of its budget 
for the purpose, but the obligation turned out to be too large to fulfill. 
Consequently, in 1995 and 1996 the government twice reduced the export tax 
                                                        
1  General trade is an administrative designation in China which is differentiated from VAT free processing 
trade, in which imports are exclusively for production of exports.   10
rebate rate. From then on, China operated a separate partial export rebate 
system, disconnected from the domestic VAT, which uses separate export rebate 
rates which change often (and by product) according to the economic situation.  11
3. Model and Calibration 
To analyze the potential impacts of VAT basis switches in China in the 
presence of China’s trade surplus, we use a standard 3 good 2 country 2 factor 
general equilibrium model, with the added feature that the trade imbalance is 
endogenously determined and supported by a fixed exchange rate and 
non-accommodative monetary policy. We use data for 2008 to calibrate model 
parameters and conduct counterfactual policy analysis. The 3×2×2 static 
structure incorporates a labor-leisure choice to yield endogeneity of factor 
supplies, as well as a fixed exchange rate, non-accommodative monetary policy, 
and a endogenously determined trade surplus. We use the model to simulate 
possible impacts of Chinese VAT regime changes from a destination basis to an 
origin basis in both equal yield format with endogenous tax rates for the new 
regime, and in fixed tax rate format.  
3.1 Model  
The model has two countries, three goods and two factors of production. 
The two countries are China and the ROW (rest of the world). The two input 
factors are labor and capital which are immobile across countries, but mobile 
across sectors. Because VAT rates in China for agriculture goods (13%), 
manufacture goods (17%) and services (3%) differ, we include three kinds of 
products in the model, agriculture, manufacturing and services. In reality China 
employs a credit invoice VAT for manufactures and a noncredit turnover tax for 
services. Since we do not explicitly model intermediate production, the separate  12
VAT form used for services does not enter our analysis.  
On the production side, we assume CES functions for each product in each 
country:  
11
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where Qi
j is the output of the ith industry in country j, Li
j and Ki
j are the labor 
and capital inputs, Φi
j is the scale parameter, δi
j is the distribution parameter 
and σi
j is the elasticity of factor substitution.  
First order conditions for cost minimization imply the factor input demand 
equations,  
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where PK
j and PL
j are the prices of capital and labor in country j.  
On the consumption side, we assume nested CES utility functions with a 
labor-leisure choice in each country. These nested functions, with three levels, 
are set out in Figure 3. The first level captures the consumption leisure choice, 
the second the domestic imported good choice, and the third the more detailed 
product choice. We use the Armington assumption under which domestic goods 
and imported goods are heterogenous to accommodate cross hauling in trade 
data, and to remove specialization problems with the model.  
  13
 
       
Equilibrium in this model is then given by market clearing prices for goods 
and factors in each country such that  
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where Di
j and Mi
j are consumption of domestic and imported goods of country i, 
L
j and  K
j are endowments of labor and capital, and Leii
j is leisure consumption 
by country i. 
Imports, Mi
j, and exports, Xi
j, are the difference between domestic demand 
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The net trade surplus S
j in country j is:  
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where pi
j is the producer price of the ith product in country j. If there is trade 
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To accommodate a trade surplus or deficit as an endogenous variable in this 
structure, we use a monetized extension of this structure incorporating a fixed 
exchange rate and non-accommodative monetary policy, similar to that in 
Whalley and Wang (2010). In this formulation prices are denominated in 
domestic currency with an exchange rate e between the two domestic moneys. 
Cross country arbitrage between the country specific prices with no taxes in 
trade yields:  
ji
ii pe p      i,j=1,2; i j                                    (9) 
If we only consider the transactions demand for money in each country and 
for simplicity assume unitary velocity and also assume exporters are paid in 
their own country currency, the money demand in country j is:  
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 is the consumer price of product i in country j, and 
j
M  is 
country jth’s money supply. In traditional models, money is neutral in the sense 
that once domestic money supplies are specified, an equilibrium exchange rate is 
determined independent of the real side, and a fixed exchange rate regime and 
trade surplus does not occur. And if the exchange rate e is fixed at  e , then the 
relative domestic money stocks  /
ij
M M  need to accommodate to  e  so as to 
support it as an equilibrium exchange rate.  
In the structure we use the monetary regime is non-accommodative to the 
fixed exchange rate; and in this case the trade surplus will be endogenously  15
determined. If we denote country 1 as China, country 1 has a trade surplus S
1 
and country 2 has a trade deficit D
2,  
11 1 1 1
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Country 1’s trade surplus will equal country 2’s trade deficit in equilibrium, 
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Into this structure we can then introduce VAT. We use t to denote the VAT 
rate and assume that the ROW does not have a VAT. In this world, a 
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      domestic goods taxed
                      (14) 
Using the above trade model with a fixed exchange rate, and 
non-accommodative monetary policy with an endogenously determined trade 
surplus, we can then simulate the trade and welfare effects of Chinese VAT 
regime switching both on the trade imbalance and on welfare. For the VAT rate  16
under the origin basis, we use revenue equivalent switching such that total 
revenue is kept equal under the two VAT regimes. In this case, the VAT rate is 
endogenously determined as we switch bases.  
    3.2 Data and Calibration 
We use 2008 as our base year and build a benchmark general equilibrium 
data set for use in calibration and simulation (see Shoven and Whalley (1992)). 
There are two countries China and ROW, three sectors agriculture, manufacture 
and service, and two factors capital and labor in our model. We take the ROW 
to be a multiple of US data as elsewhere in literature (4.216 times in Dong and 
Whalley, 2009). 
The data we use in model calibration as the base case equilibrium are listed 
in Table 3. All Chinese data except trade data are from the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) and Chinese Statistic Yearbook. Chinese trade data are from 
the WTO statistics database. US data except capital are from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis database, and US capital data are from US census bureau 
“2010 Capital Spending Report”. The foreign exchange rate we use is the 
average exchange rate for the RMB to US dollar in 2008. Chinese work hours are 
calculated according to the labor law that each employees work 8 hours per day, 
and every year has 104 weekend holidays and 11 festival holidays so that each 
has 250 (=365-104-11) work days. Each Chinese labor is assumed to work 250 
multiply 8 equals 2000 hours each year. Annual working hours of per worker for 
ROW, are taken as the same as average work hour of the world, that is 1764  17
hours according to OECD report (OECD, 2008). From this working hour data 
we calculate base case leisure consumption. 
    The production and utility functions in our model are all of the CES type, 
and the elasticity specification used in them can affect model results. There are 
no available estimates of elasticities for China either on the demand or 
production side (Dong and Whalley, 2009). Many of the estimates of domestic 
and import good substitution elasticity are around 2 (Betina, 2003), so we set all 
of these elasticities in our model to 2 (the same as Whalley and Wang (2010)). 
We change these elasticities later in sensitivity analysis to check their influence 
on simulation results. 
 
Table 3 Data Used for Calibration and Simulation (2008 Data) 
Contents/Country 
China (Million RMB)  ROW (Million USD) 
Agriculture Manufacture  Services  Agriculture Manufacture  Services 
Trade 
Export 675008.16  9234482.76  2034164.23  393701.00  733439.00 316008.00 
Import 2734292.82  5093807.20  2194707.16  97192.00  1329640.00  292892.00 
Factor 
Capital 169414.37  3835942.19  4449169.60  10000.35  2113118.22  3338582.94 
Labor Number  306.54  211.09  257.17  5.41  93.37 400.69 
Labor Hour  2685290.40  1849148.40  2252809.20  47420.89  817936.55 3510069.42 
Work Hour  613080.00 422180.00  514340.00  9549.14  164707.77 706822.20 
Leisure 2072210.40  1426968.40  1738469.20  37871.75  653228.78 2803247.22 
Total Production  3400000.00  14618340.00 12048661.00  1610802.90  31774895.84 78651824.10 
VAT 13%  17%  3%  0  0 0 
Consumption 5459284.66  10477664.43 12209203.93  360720.96  34288479.26 78554367.04 
Exchange Rate  6.95  0.14 
Surplus 1920847.98  -276576.00 
Money Supply  47516660.00  396554852.00 
Source: Chinese data except trade come from National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and Chinese Statistic Yearbook, Chinese 
trade data come from “WTO Statistics Database”; ROW data except capital get from BEA database (www.bea.gov ), ROW’s 
capital data get from US census bureau “2010 Capital Spending Report”.  
 
    Table 4 reports the share and scale parameters generated by calibration.  18
When used in model solution these regenerate the benchmark data set in Table 
3 as an equilibrium for the model.  
 
Table 4 Parameters Generated by Calibration 
Country/Content 
China   ROW 
Agr.  Manu.  Service  Agr.  Manu. Service 
Goods Consumption Share 
China  0.1503  0.2971  0.5526  0.2727 0.5083 0.2190 
ROW  0.0075  0.9710  0.0216  0.0111 0.2807 0.7083 
Share Parameter in Production 
K  0.2165  0.9009  0.8964  0.5115 0.9277 0.8253 
L  0.7835  0.0991  0.1036  0.4885 0.0723 0.1747 
Scale Parameter in Production  6.2003  4.0125  2.8581  164.6608  15.6083  25.8105 
Amington Share 
Domestic  0.6439  0.9848 
Import  0.3561  0.0152 
Leisure and Consumption Share 
Leisure  0.7717  0.7986 
Consumption  0.2283  0.2014 
Note: Agriculture is abbreviated as Agr. and Manufacture as Manu.   19
4. Simulation Results 
    We report model results for a series of model experiments in which the 
Chinese VAT is switched from a destination to an origin basis. All of the results 
are reported as per percentage changes compared to the base case equilibrium 
with a VAT destination basis; that is the origin principle model equilibrium 
minus the destination principle model equilibrium. We then divide by 
destination principle values to give percentage changes. We are interested in 
trade imbalance effects, trade effects, tax revenue effects, production effects and 
welfare effects, but also report Hicksian equivalent variations (EV) for the 
changes. Additionally, we report sensitivity analyses for elasticity parameters on 
simulation results.  
4.1 Simulation Results  
When the Chinese VAT regime is switched from a destination principle to 
an origin basis, Chinese export prices, which now include the tax increase, and 
import prices decrease. Chinese imports increase and exports (plus the trade 
surplus) decrease. Additionally, this change increases Chinese VAT revenues. 
We use two different methods to calculate the VAT rates and VAT revenues 
from regime switching. The first is the traditional equal yield tax reform as in 
the literature (Shoven and Whalley, 1977; Feldstein, 1974; Pereira, 1995; 
Hamilton, 1999), which keeps tax revenues constant and has tax rates 
endogenously determined. The second keeps tax rates constant and has tax 
revenues endogenously determined. We analyze these two cases separately.   20
4.1.1 Equal Yield Tax Basis Switching 
Since we have three different products in our model, their VAT rates are 
different. Table 5 reports results for trade, production and welfare for equal yield 
VAT regime switching. In the equal yield tax analyses reported here, we assume 
these three rates change by the same proportion in a basis switch so as to 
preserve tax revenues.  
 
Table 5 Simulation Results For Chinese Equal Yield VAT Basis Switching (2008 Data) 
Country Item  Import Export 
Trade 
Imbalance 
Production  EV 
Equal Yield 
VAT Rate for 
Origin Basis 
 China 
Total 6.24%  -4.39%  -59.84%  -1.73%  0.26%  — 
Agriculture  11.44% -9.99%  —  -1.69%  — 9.88% 
Manufacture  6.08% -4.89%  —  -9.50%  — 12.92% 
Service 0.12%  -0.26%  —  7.68%  — 2.28% 
 ROW 
Total -4.39%  6.24%  -59.84%  0.45%  0.69%  — 
Agriculture  -9.99% 11.44%  —  1.10%  —  — 
Manufacture  -4.89% 6.08%  —  1.96%  —  — 
Service -0.26%  0.12%  —  -0.17%  —  — 
 
These results suggest that the trade surplus in China could decrease by 
59.84% of its former size under VAT regime switching. This could be a major 
contribution to global rebalancing, and would be accompanied by a welfare gain 
for both China and the rest of the world. Under the basis switch Chinese exports 
of agriculture, manufactures and service separately decrease by 9.99%, 4.89% 
and 0.26%, and imports of these three kinds of products separately increase by 
11.44%, 6.08% and 0.12%. Agricultural output changes the most, then 
manufactures and lastly services. Because manufacturing account for most of the  21
Chinese trade surplus, its changes determines most of the trade imbalance 
changes. Although exports and imports do not change a lot, their different 
signed effects decrease the trade surplus substantially. In our two country model, 
Chinese imports equal ROW’s exports and Chinese exports equal ROW’s 
imports. These import and export changes are the same as in Table 5, and the 
Chinese trade surplus equals ROW’s trade deficit.  
Total production in China decreases by 1.73% which reflects decreased 
exports and increased imports. The production change is less in percentage 
terms than in trade which means that Chinese domestic demand increases after 
VAT regime switching. Production of ROW increases by 0.45% reflecting the 
Chinese trade imbalance adjustment. 
The Hicksian equivalent variation gain for China for the change is 0.26% of 
GDP and for the ROW 0.69%. This suggests VAT regime switching can improve 
both countries’ welfare. Chinese domestic products have prices lowered and 
improved consumer welfare follows, and the ROW’s production increases and 
improves its welfare. 
In order to keep total VAT revenues unchanged, Chinese VAT rates 
decrease because of the trade surplus status. These simulation results indicate 
that the VAT rate can be reduced by 23.99%, and VAT rates for agriculture, 
manufacture and service are 9.88%, 12.92% and 2.28% respectively.  
    4.1.2 Equal Tax Rate Basis Switching 
Table 6 also reports equal tax rate basis switching simulation results in  22
which tax rates remain unchanged but tax revenues rise. Total Chinese imports 
increase by 6.77% and agriculture, manufacture and service imports separately 
increase by 11.63%, 7.02% and 0.13%. Total exports decrease by 4.63% and 
agriculture, manufacture and service products by 10.38%, 5.17% and 0.27%. 
These changes jointly decrease the trade imbalance by 64.11%, a little more than 
in the equal yield case. Trade effects are more severe than equal yield tax 
switching.  
 
Table 6 Simulation Results of Equal Tax Rate VAT Basis Switching in China (2008 data) 
Country Item  Import  Export 
Trade 
Imbalance 
Production  EV Revenue 
 China 
Total 6.77%  -4.63%  -64.11%  -1.87%  0.23% 7.42% 
Agriculture 11.63%  -10.38%  —  -1.72%  — -38.79% 
Manufacture  7.02% -5.17%  —  -9.61%  — 26.11% 
Service 0.13%  -0.27%  —  7.49%  — 6.08% 
 ROW 
Total -4.63%  6.77%  -64.11%  0.53%  0.74%  — 
Agriculture -10.38%  11.63%  —  1.34%  —  — 
Manufacture  -5.17% 7.02%  —  2.16%  —  — 
Service -0.27%  0.13%  —  -0.15%  —  — 
 
On the production side, China’s output decreases 1.87% in total. 
Production of agriculture and manufacture separately decrease by 1.72% and 
9.61% and services increase by 7.49%. Production of the ROW increases by 
0.53% and its agriculture and manufacture output increases by 1.34% and 2.16%, 
while services decrease by 0.15%. In welfare terms, China and the ROW both 
benefit from the switching; China’s EV is 0.23% of GDP and the ROW 0.74%.  23
China’s total VAT revenue increases if we use equal tax rate switching. These 
results show that total revenues increase by 7.42%; in detail, agriculture 
decreases by 38.79%, and manufacture and service separately increase by 26.11% 
and 6.08%. 
In general, equal tax rate VAT regime switching decreases China’s exports 
a little more and also increases imports by more, and the two effects jointly 
decrease the trade surplus more. Although China experiences a negative 
production effect, its welfare and tax revenue increase.  
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
In our model, the elasticity parameter values we use reflect available 
literature. But changing these parameters value can change results, and so we 
provide sensitivity analyze for different elasticity parameters. We change 
elasticity parameters to different values and compare results of VAT basis 
switching on trade, production, VAT revenues and welfare. In order to simplify 
our sensitivity analyze, we assume all of the elasticity parameters are equal and 
do not change each elasticity value one by one. We choose elasticity values equal 
to 0.5, 0.8, 1.2, 1.6, 2.1 and 2.4. In our sensitivity analyze, we focus on the equal 
tax yield case.  
Table 7 reports sensitivity analysis results for Chinese VAT basis switching. 
In general, all of these elasticity variations do not change results that much. The 
export impacts change from -4.29% to -4.89%, import impacts change from 
6.21% to 6.92%, trade surplus impacts change from -59.63% to -66.51%, Chinese  24
production impacts change from -1.39% to -1.83%, and EVs change from 0.20% 
to 0.31%. All of these changes are within 30% of their central case values.  
 
Table 7 Sensitivity of Results For Equal Yield VAT Basis Changes in China (2008 data) 
Elasticity Values  0.5  0.8  1.2  1.6  2.0 2.4 
Export Impacts -4.29%  -4.50%  -4.89%  -4.78%  -4.39% -4.37% 
Import Impacts 6.85%  6.62%  6.92%  6.21%  6.24% 6.22% 
Trade Surplus Changes  -62.42% -62.52%  -66.51%  -62.13%  -59.84% -59.63% 
Production Changes -1.67%  -1.39%  -1.83%  -1.78%  -1.73% -1.47% 
EV 0.28%  0.31%  0.20%  0.21%  0.26% 0.23% 
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Trade rebalancing has become a major focus of discussion in the G20, and is 
now taken as a task for the entire world after the 2008 financial crisis. Present 
G20 summit discussions focus on members adjusting exchange rates. Here, we 
argue that for China with a large trade surplus, VAT basis switching from a 
destination to an origin basis may also be a significant accompanying measure 
yielding reductions in China’s trade imbalance of over 50% and also welfare 
gains both for China and the world. 
We use a two country, three sector and two factor global trade equilibrium 
model with a fixed exchange rate and non-accommodative monetary policy in a 
structure which accommodates an endogenous trade imbalance to simulate the 
possible effects of Chinese VAT regime switching from a destination basis to an 
origin basis. We use data for 2008 as our base year. Our results suggest that the 
Chinese trade surplus and total production would both decrease under such a 
change and there will be a positive welfare benefit for China. Production in 
ROW will also increase.  
These results thus suggest that Chinese VAT regime switching can not only 
reduce the Chinese trade imbalance, and also benefit both China and the ROW, 
and that G20 discussion of rebalancing could usefully focus not only on exchange 
rate reassignments, but also on other possible instruments. Using the origin 
principle in the Chinese VAT may also have other advantages, including lower 
administrative costs, and can alleviate the export rebate burden on the Chinese 
government budget.   26
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